Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Résumé of Metaphysics', 'Understanding and Essence' and 'Shame and Necessity'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
19259 If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
19262 Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
19267 Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
19268 Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19265 Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19260 Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
19266 In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2181 It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
2176 There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
19264 Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
4317 We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
2174 Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
2178 In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
5049 Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
2169 Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
2172 The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
2179 If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
2180 If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
5048 Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
2175 There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
5050 Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz]