16 ideas
18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
19406 | I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz] |
18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
15148 | Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty] |
15145 | A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty] |
15147 | Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty] |
18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
15144 | Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty] |
18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
15146 | Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty] |
15151 | Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty] |