33 ideas
| 12104 | All ideas must be understood historically [Comte] |
| 12105 | Our knowledge starts in theology, passes through metaphysics, and ends in positivism [Comte] |
| 12112 | Metaphysics is just the oversubtle qualification of abstract names for phenomena [Comte] |
| 12111 | Positivism is the final state of human intelligence [Comte] |
| 12106 | Positivism gives up absolute truth, and seeks phenomenal laws, by reason and observation [Comte] |
| 12114 | Science can drown in detail, so we need broad scientists (to keep out the metaphysicians) [Comte] |
| 12116 | Only positivist philosophy can terminate modern social crises [Comte] |
| 19342 | Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz] |
| 12711 | The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz] |
| 19349 | The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz] |
| 7558 | Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz] |
| 16761 | Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz] |
| 13088 | Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz] |
| 13085 | Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 12108 | All real knowledge rests on observed facts [Comte] |
| 5024 | Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz] |
| 5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
| 12109 | We must observe in order to form theories, but connected observations need prior theories [Comte] |
| 12107 | Positivism explains facts by connecting particular phenomena with general facts [Comte] |
| 5167 | The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer] |
| 12115 | Introspection is pure illusion; we can obviously observe everything except ourselves [Comte] |
| 5027 | If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz] |
| 5023 | Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz] |
| 2119 | People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz] |
| 5025 | Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz] |
| 5164 | A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer] |
| 5165 | Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer] |
| 5166 | The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer] |
| 5162 | Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer] |
| 5026 | Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz] |
| 5168 | Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer] |
| 12113 | The search for first or final causes is futile [Comte] |
| 12110 | We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte] |