Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Discourse on Metaphysics', 'On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning' and 'Sweet Dreams'

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27 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz]