15 ideas
| 8378 | Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell] |
| 19404 | Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
| 15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
| 8375 | 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell] |
| 15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
| 15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
| 15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
| 15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
| 15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
| 4396 | The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell] |
| 8376 | If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell] |
| 8380 | Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell] |
| 8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
| 8381 | The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell] |
| 19403 | Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz] |