Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Discourse on Metaphysics', 'Absolute Necessities' and 'The Foundations of Mathematics'

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29 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale]
Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz]