18 ideas
| 19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
| 19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 15086 | Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale] |
| 8261 | Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale] |
| 15081 | A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale] |
| 15080 | 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale] |
| 15082 | Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale] |
| 15085 | 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale] |
| 15088 | Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale] |
| 8361 | What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv] |
| 15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |
| 19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
| 8363 | p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv] |
| 8364 | We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv] |
| 8366 | The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv] |
| 8362 | We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv] |
| 8360 | We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv] |
| 8365 | Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv] |