Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier', 'Absolute Necessities' and 'Nominalism'

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14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale]
Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]