94 ideas
19359 | Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
13086 | Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
16710 | Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
13567 | Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science [Ellis] |
16897 | Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Leibniz, by Burge] |
3346 | For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
3347 | Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
8627 | Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Leibniz, by Frege] |
13604 | Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind [Ellis] |
13606 | Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic [Ellis] |
9147 | Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K on Leibniz] |
19375 | The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
18081 | Nature uses the infinite everywhere [Leibniz] |
18080 | A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together [Leibniz] |
7565 | Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
10419 | If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Leibniz, by Swoyer] |
13078 | Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real [Leibniz] |
13584 | The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis] |
13587 | There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis] |
13577 | Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis] |
9436 | The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis] |
13582 | 'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis] |
13580 | Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do [Ellis] |
13598 | Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) [Ellis] |
13568 | Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis] |
13586 | Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis] |
12713 | Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber] |
13087 | The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13585 | The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis] |
13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis] |
13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis] |
13572 | There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis] |
13573 | Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis] |
12701 | Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Leibniz, by Garber] |
13105 | The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
16513 | Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence [Leibniz] |
12035 | Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Leibniz, by Adams,RM] |
13091 | Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
7561 | Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
12715 | Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Leibniz, by Garber] |
13571 | Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis] |
11878 | Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P] |
11862 | Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
13578 | The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis] |
16504 | Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz] |
8650 | Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz] |
13828 | Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking] |
13576 | Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis] |
13084 | How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz] |
4307 | A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz] |
13570 | Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis] |
15883 | Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré] |
18822 | Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt] |
7837 | Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
13080 | Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
19332 | For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
5509 | Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
7568 | Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
13607 | If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis] |
13597 | Good explanations unify [Ellis] |
13601 | Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis] |
13092 | The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers [Leibniz] |
13569 | To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds [Ellis] |
19354 | Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
13600 | The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential [Ellis] |
7841 | We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem [Leibniz] |
5510 | Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
7564 | Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
19372 | Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
13467 | Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD] |
19365 | Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
8110 | Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Leibniz, by Gardner] |
7569 | Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
7574 | Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
12728 | Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber] |
19374 | Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz] |
7560 | Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz] |
16683 | Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
13583 | There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis] |
13574 | Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis] |
13575 | If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis] |
13595 | Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis] |
13566 | A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis] |
13579 | What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis] |
13581 | Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis] |
13594 | The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis] |
13603 | A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis] |
12725 | Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber] |
16507 | The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz] |
7859 | Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
15307 | Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential [Leibniz] |
3889 | God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Leibniz, by Scruton] |
7842 | Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |