17 ideas
| 3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
| 7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
| 3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
| 3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
| 19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
| 7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
| 3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
| 3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
| 3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
| 3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
| 3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
| 3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
| 3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
| 3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
| 4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
| 14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |
| 12709 | Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz] |