11 ideas
| 22664 | I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick] |
| 7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
| 22665 | Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick] |
| 19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
| 7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
| 22662 | In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick] |
| 22666 | Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick] |
| 22667 | Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick] |
| 22663 | Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick] |
| 14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |
| 12709 | Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz] |