9 ideas
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 12694 | Essence is the distinct thinkability of anything [Leibniz] |
| 14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
| 14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
| 14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
| 14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |