43 ideas
16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
14308 | We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford] |
12699 | A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz] |
12700 | Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz] |
7384 | Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett] |
12736 | If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber] |
16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
7374 | Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett] |
16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
7369 | Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett] |
7393 | We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett] |
7367 | Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett] |
7394 | Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett] |
7391 | We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett] |
7387 | "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett] |
7376 | We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett] |
7372 | In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett] |
7373 | Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett] |
7385 | People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett] |
7383 | The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett] |
7386 | Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett] |
7381 | We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett] |
7382 | We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett] |
7370 | The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett] |
12698 | Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz] |
7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
7365 | Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett] |
7371 | All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett] |
7380 | Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett] |
7366 | It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett] |
16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |
7368 | Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett] |