11 ideas
| 19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
| 19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
| 12719 | Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz] |
| 12720 | Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz] |