Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Wagner', 'Attitudes De Dicto and De Se' and 'The Question of Ontology'

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15 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
12215 The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
12211 It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
12209 The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
12214 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
12212 Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
12216 Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K]
12218 Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
12217 For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
12213 Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
18415 The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
16392 A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
18416 Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
16390 Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
18418 A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
19436 Bare or primary matter is passive; it is clothed or secondary matter which contains action [Leibniz]