Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier', 'Mathematics is Megethology' and 'Matters of Mind'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


19 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis]
The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis]
The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis]
Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon]
Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]