15 ideas
| 5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 20575 | Socialist economics needs a very strong central power, virtually leading to slavery [Hayek, by Oksala] |
| 22599 | Hayek was a liberal, but mainly concerned with market freedom [Hayek, by Dunt] |
| 22600 | Impeding the market is likely to lead to extensive state control [Hayek] |
| 5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |