Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conspectus libelli (book outline)', 'Pref to new 'Materialist Theory'' and 'Particulars in Particular Clothing'

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13 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong]