11 ideas
| 5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
| 14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
| 6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
| 5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
| 2957 | Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood] |
| 3285 | We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel] |
| 5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
| 5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
| 5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
| 4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |