37 ideas
19342 | Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz] |
12249 | 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg] |
12242 | Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg] |
14263 | Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K] |
12238 | The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg] |
12254 | Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg] |
14262 | Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K] |
12253 | If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg] |
12711 | The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz] |
12256 | We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg] |
19349 | The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz] |
7558 | Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz] |
12252 | Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg] |
16761 | Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz] |
13088 | Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz] |
12241 | Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG] |
12244 | Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg] |
12240 | Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg] |
12247 | Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg] |
12258 | Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg] |
12257 | Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg] |
12236 | Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg] |
12250 | Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg] |
12234 | Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg] |
12235 | Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg] |
12237 | Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg] |
13085 | Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
5024 | Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz] |
5027 | If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz] |
5023 | Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz] |
2119 | People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz] |
5025 | Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz] |
5026 | Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz] |
12245 | Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg] |
12246 | What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg] |
12239 | The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg] |
12243 | The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg] |