16 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 19406 | I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author [Leibniz] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 2526 | Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett] |
| 2523 | That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 2528 | Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett] |
| 2525 | Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett] |
| 2527 | Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett] |
| 2530 | Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett] |
| 2524 | A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett] |
| 2529 | Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |