Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'New system of communication of substances', 'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' and 'Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]