22 ideas
| 18073 | Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher] |
| 19057 | Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett] |
| 5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
| 5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
| 5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
| 4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
| 3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
| 2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
| 6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
| 3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 19055 | Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett] |
| 19056 | If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett] |
| 19054 | Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett] |
| 3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |