Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians', 'A Priori' and 'The Analysis of Matter'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
17713 After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17715 The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17716 Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
6402 In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
14732 A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
14733 An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
17703 Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
6418 Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
17714 Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
17705 Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
17700 The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
17704 Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
13195 To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
13193 Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
17710 Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
17706 The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
17701 Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
17702 Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
13194 God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
13196 All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz]
13192 Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
21706 At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
17708 Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares]