36 ideas
8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
10147 | The Axiom of Choice is consistent with the other axioms of set theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
10148 | Axiom of Choice: a set exists which chooses just one element each of any set of sets [Feferman/Feferman] |
10149 | Platonist will accept the Axiom of Choice, but others want criteria of selection or definition [Feferman/Feferman] |
10150 | The Trichotomy Principle is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice [Feferman/Feferman] |
10146 | Cantor's theories needed the Axiom of Choice, but it has led to great controversy [Feferman/Feferman] |
8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
10158 | A structure is a 'model' when the axioms are true. So which of the structures are models? [Feferman/Feferman] |
10162 | Tarski and Vaught established the equivalence relations between first-order structures [Feferman/Feferman] |
10160 | Löwenheim-Skolem says if the sentences are countable, so is the model [Feferman/Feferman] |
10159 | Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and Gödel's completeness of first-order logic, the earliest model theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
10161 | If a sentence holds in every model of a theory, then it is logically derivable from the theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
10156 | 'Recursion theory' concerns what can be solved by computing machines [Feferman/Feferman] |
10155 | Both Principia Mathematica and Peano Arithmetic are undecidable [Feferman/Feferman] |
19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |