14 ideas
| 17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
| 16639 | Only individual bodies exist [Bacon] |
| 16033 | There are only individual bodies containing law-based powers, and the Forms are these laws [Bacon] |
| 17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
| 17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
| 17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
| 17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
| 17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
| 17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
| 17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
| 21950 | Science must clear away the idols of the mind if they are ever going to find the truth [Bacon] |
| 5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
| 5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
| 5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |