Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Remond de Montmort', 'Principia Ethica' and 'The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston)'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is the study and criticsm of cultural beliefs, to achieve new possibilities [Dewey]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Liberalism should improve the system, and not just ameliorate it [Dewey]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
Some necessary truths are brute, and others derive from final causes [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge is either the product of competent enquiry, or it is meaningless [Dewey]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
The quest for certainty aims for peace, and avoidance of the stress of action [Dewey]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
No belief can be so settled that it is not subject to further inquiry [Dewey]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
Mind is never isolated, but only exists in its interactions [Dewey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments [Leibniz]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Passions reside in confused perceptions [Leibniz]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals aim to allow individuals to realise their capacities [Dewey]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
The things in civilisation we prize are the products of other members of our community [Dewey]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God produces possibilities, and thus ideas [Leibniz]
'God' is an imaginative unity of ideal values [Dewey]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
We should try attaching the intensity of religious devotion to intelligent social action [Dewey]
Religions are so shockingly diverse that they have no common element [Dewey]