107 ideas
| 19359 | Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
| 13086 | Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 16710 | Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
| 16897 | Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Leibniz, by Burge] |
| 3346 | For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
| 3347 | Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
| 8627 | Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Leibniz, by Frege] |
| 10702 | Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter] |
| 10713 | Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter] |
| 13044 | Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter] |
| 10708 | Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter] |
| 13546 | The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter] |
| 10707 | Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter] |
| 10704 | We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter] |
| 10703 | Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter] |
| 9147 | Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K on Leibniz] |
| 10712 | If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter] |
| 19375 | The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
| 18081 | Nature uses the infinite everywhere [Leibniz] |
| 18080 | A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together [Leibniz] |
| 17882 | It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter] |
| 3942 | I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley] |
| 3952 | I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley] |
| 7565 | Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 10419 | If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Leibniz, by Swoyer] |
| 13078 | Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real [Leibniz] |
| 13043 | A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter] |
| 12713 | Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 13087 | The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 12701 | Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 13105 | The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 16513 | Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence [Leibniz] |
| 12035 | Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Leibniz, by Adams,RM] |
| 13042 | If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter] |
| 13091 | Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 3959 | There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley] |
| 7561 | Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 12715 | Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 13041 | Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter] |
| 11878 | Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P] |
| 11862 | Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
| 16504 | Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz] |
| 8650 | Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz] |
| 10709 | Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter] |
| 13828 | Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking] |
| 3946 | A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley] |
| 13084 | How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz] |
| 4307 | A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz] |
| 15883 | Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré] |
| 18822 | Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt] |
| 7837 | Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
| 13080 | Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 19332 | For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
| 3958 | Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley] |
| 3943 | If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley] |
| 3931 | Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
| 5192 | Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer] |
| 5174 | Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley] |
| 5509 | Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 7568 | Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 1103 | 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley] |
| 6403 | For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling] |
| 3936 | Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley] |
| 3930 | There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley] |
| 3939 | I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley] |
| 3945 | There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley] |
| 3947 | Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley] |
| 3933 | Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley] |
| 3934 | A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley] |
| 3935 | The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley] |
| 3937 | 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley] |
| 3940 | Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley] |
| 3957 | Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley] |
| 3953 | Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley] |
| 3938 | Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley] |
| 3944 | It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley] |
| 3932 | A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley] |
| 13092 | The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers [Leibniz] |
| 3948 | Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley] |
| 19354 | Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
| 7841 | We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem [Leibniz] |
| 5510 | Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 7564 | Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 3941 | How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley] |
| 5374 | Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley] |
| 19372 | Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
| 13467 | Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD] |
| 19365 | Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
| 8110 | Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Leibniz, by Gardner] |
| 3954 | Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley] |
| 7569 | Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 7574 | Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
| 12728 | Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 19374 | Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz] |
| 7560 | Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz] |
| 16683 | Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
| 12725 | Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 16507 | The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz] |
| 7859 | Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
| 15307 | Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential [Leibniz] |
| 3950 | There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley] |
| 3951 | There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley] |
| 3889 | God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Leibniz, by Scruton] |
| 3949 | It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley] |
| 7842 | Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
| 3956 | People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley] |
| 3955 | If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley] |