Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil', 'Thought' and 'The Mystery of Consciousness'

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46 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Inference is never a conscious process [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman]
Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman]
Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Circles must be bounded, so cannot be infinite [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman]
Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
Sloth's Syllogism: either it can't happen, or it is inevitable without my effort [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Defining dispositions is circular [Harman]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Evil is a negation of good, which arises from non-being [Leibniz]
God only made sin possible because a much greater good can be derived from it [Leibniz]