39 ideas
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
7689 | The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette] |
13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
7681 | Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette] |
7682 | Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette] |
7697 | On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette] |
7701 | Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette] |
7707 | To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette] |
7692 | Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette] |
7687 | Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette] |
7679 | Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette] |
13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
7678 | Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette] |
7683 | Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette] |
7684 | Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette] |
7703 | If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette] |
7685 | An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette] |
7699 | Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette] |
12699 | A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz] |
12700 | Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz] |
12736 | If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber] |
7691 | The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette] |
7688 | The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette] |
7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette] |
12698 | Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz] |
7704 | Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette] |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
7702 | The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette] |
13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |