36 ideas
23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
19342 | Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz] |
23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
12711 | The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz] |
19349 | The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz] |
7558 | Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz] |
16761 | Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz] |
13088 | Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz] |
13085 | Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
5024 | Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz] |
5027 | If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz] |
5023 | Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz] |
2119 | People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz] |
5025 | Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz] |
23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
5026 | Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz] |
23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |