Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Discourse on Metaphysics', 'Letters to Burcher De Volder' and 'Just and Unjust Wars'

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64 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz]
Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz]
The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Only unities have any reality [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz]
A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz]
If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz]
In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer]
Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer]
The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer]
Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer]
The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer]
States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer]
Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer]
States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer]
With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer]
For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer]
Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer]
Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer]
The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer]
We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer]
Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer]
What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer]
If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz]