130 ideas
19359 | Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
13086 | Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
16710 | Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
12865 | Analytic philosophers may prefer formal systems because natural language is such mess [Simons] |
16897 | Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Leibniz, by Burge] |
3346 | For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
3347 | Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA] |
8627 | Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Leibniz, by Frege] |
12815 | Classical mereology doesn't apply well to the objects around us [Simons] |
12832 | Complement: the rest of the Universe apart from some individual, written x-bar [Simons] |
12834 | Criticisms of mereology: parts? transitivity? sums? identity? four-dimensional? [Simons] |
12819 | A 'part' has different meanings for individuals, classes, and masses [Simons] |
12822 | Proper or improper part: x < y, 'x is (a) part of y' [Simons] |
12823 | Overlap: two parts overlap iff they have a part in common, expressed as 'x o y' [Simons] |
12824 | Disjoint: two individuals are disjoint iff they do not overlap, written 'x | y' [Simons] |
12825 | Product: the product of two individuals is the sum of all of their overlaps, written 'x ˇ y' [Simons] |
12826 | Sum: the sum of individuals is what is overlapped if either of them are, written 'x + y' [Simons] |
12827 | Difference: the difference of individuals is the remainder of an overlap, written 'x - y' [Simons] |
12828 | General sum: the sum of objects satisfying some predicate, written σx(Fx) [Simons] |
12829 | General product: the nucleus of all objects satisfying a predicate, written πx(Fx) [Simons] |
12830 | Universe: the mereological sum of all objects whatever, written 'U' [Simons] |
12831 | Atom: an individual with no proper parts, written 'At x' [Simons] |
12844 | Dissective: stuff is dissective if parts of the stuff are always the stuff [Simons] |
12813 | Two standard formalisations of part-whole theory are the Calculus of Individuals, and Mereology [Simons] |
12816 | Classical mereology doesn't handle temporal or modal notions very well [Simons] |
12821 | The part-relation is transitive and asymmetric (and thus irreflexive) [Simons] |
18847 | Each wheel is part of a car, but the four wheels are not a further part [Simons] |
12846 | A 'group' is a collection with a condition which constitutes their being united [Simons] |
12848 | The same members may form two groups [Simons] |
12861 | 'The wolves' are the matter of 'the pack'; the latter is a group, with different identity conditions [Simons] |
12876 | Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons] |
12845 | Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons] |
9147 | Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K on Leibniz] |
19375 | The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
18081 | Nature uses the infinite everywhere [Leibniz] |
18080 | A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together [Leibniz] |
19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
12838 | Four-dimensional ontology has no change, since that needs an object, and time to pass [Simons] |
12842 | There are real relational changes, as well as bogus 'Cambridge changes' [Simons] |
12841 | I don't believe in processes [Simons] |
12836 | Fans of process ontology cheat, since river-stages refer to 'rivers' [Simons] |
12882 | A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process [Simons] |
12880 | Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things [Simons] |
12883 | Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis [Simons] |
12881 | A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes [Simons] |
12840 | I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons] |
12839 | Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons] |
12879 | Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons] |
7565 | Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
12847 | Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons] |
12862 | Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons] |
12863 | Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons] |
12859 | A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients. [Simons] |
12858 | Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient [Simons] |
10419 | If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Leibniz, by Swoyer] |
13078 | Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real [Leibniz] |
12713 | Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber] |
13087 | The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
12701 | Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Leibniz, by Garber] |
12850 | To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons] |
13105 | The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
12860 | Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons] |
16513 | Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence [Leibniz] |
12886 | A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts [Simons] |
12035 | Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Leibniz, by Adams,RM] |
13091 | Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
7561 | Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
12835 | Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail? [Simons] |
12857 | Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't [Simons] |
12820 | Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons] |
12715 | Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Leibniz, by Garber] |
12866 | Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons] |
12867 | A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons] |
12864 | We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons] |
12814 | Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence [Simons] |
12817 | 'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical [Simons] |
12833 | If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals [Simons] |
12849 | Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals [Simons] |
12877 | Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy. [Simons] |
12888 | The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons] |
12871 | Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are [Simons] |
12870 | We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons] |
11878 | Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P] |
12873 | Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts [Simons] |
12874 | An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole [Simons] |
11862 | Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins] |
12837 | Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think [Simons] |
12856 | Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts [Simons] |
12885 | Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified [Simons] |
12854 | An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end [Simons] |
12855 | The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?' [Simons] |
12872 | The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism [Simons] |
16504 | Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz] |
8650 | Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz] |
13828 | Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking] |
13084 | How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz] |
4307 | A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz] |
15883 | Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré] |
18822 | Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt] |
7837 | Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
12889 | The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual [Simons] |
13080 | Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
19332 | For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
5509 | Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
7568 | Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
13092 | The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers [Leibniz] |
19354 | Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
7841 | We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem [Leibniz] |
5510 | Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi] |
7564 | Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
19372 | Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Leibniz, by Arthur,R] |
13467 | Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD] |
12843 | With activities if you are doing it you've done it, with performances you must finish to have done it [Simons] |
19365 | Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
8110 | Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Leibniz, by Gardner] |
12875 | One false note doesn't make it a performance of a different work [Simons] |
7569 | Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
7574 | Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
12728 | Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber] |
19374 | Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz] |
7560 | Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz] |
16683 | Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau] |
12725 | Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber] |
16507 | The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz] |
7859 | Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
15307 | Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential [Leibniz] |
3889 | God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Leibniz, by Scruton] |
7842 | Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |