Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians', 'Logic in Mathematics' and 'On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura)'

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33 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege]
The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege]
The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege]
A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege]
Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz]
To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege]
We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege]
A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz]
It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz]
Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz]