11 ideas
| 22664 | I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick] |
| 22665 | Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick] |
| 12710 | As well as extension, bodies contain powers [Leibniz] |
| 13856 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington] |
| 8948 | The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher] |
| 13767 | Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice] |
| 14277 | A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington] |
| 22662 | In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick] |
| 22666 | Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick] |
| 22667 | Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick] |
| 22663 | Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick] |