16 ideas
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
| 9261 | The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard] |
| 5049 | Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz] |
| 9262 | The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard] |
| 9260 | Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard] |
| 9259 | We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard] |
| 9258 | If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard] |
| 5048 | Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz] |
| 5050 | Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz] |