18 ideas
19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
8845 | An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor] |
8842 | The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor] |
8843 | Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor] |
8844 | Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor] |
8846 | Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor] |
19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
8847 | Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor] |
19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |