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All the ideas for 'Reply to 'Rorarius' 2nd ed', 'Causal Powers' and 'The Social Contract (tr Cress)'

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189 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Both nature and reason require that everything has a cause [Rousseau]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / e. Psychologism
There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality
Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden]
Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden]
Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden]
We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden]
Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden]
Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden]
A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden]
The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden]
Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden]
People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden]
Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden]
There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden]
Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden]
There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden]
Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden]
The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden]
Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden]
Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden]
The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden]
The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden]
Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Without freedom of will actions lack moral significance [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Natural mankind is too fragmented for states of peace, or of war and enmity [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Rousseau assumes that laws need a people united by custom and tradition [Rousseau, by Wolff,J]
The act of becoming 'a people' is the real foundation of society [Rousseau]
To overcome obstacles, people must unite their forces into a single unified power [Rousseau]
Human nature changes among a people, into a moral and partial existence [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
A state must be big enough to preserve itself, but small enough to be governable [Rousseau]
Too much land is a struggle, producing defensive war; too little makes dependence, and offensive war [Rousseau]
If the state enlarges, the creators of the general will become less individually powerful [Rousseau]
If the population is larger, the government needs to be more powerful [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains [Rousseau]
No man has any natural authority over his fellows [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A state's purpose is liberty and equality - liberty for strength, and equality for liberty [Rousseau]
The greatest social good comes down to freedom and equality [Rousseau]
The measure of a successful state is increase in its population [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
The sovereignty does not appoint the leaders [Rousseau]
Rousseau insists that popular sovereignty needs a means of expressing consent [Rousseau, by Oksala]
Sovereignty is the exercise of the general will, which can never be delegated [Rousseau]
Just as people control their limbs, the general-will state has total control of its members [Rousseau]
Political laws are fundamental, as they firmly organise the state - but they could still be changed [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / b. Natural authority
Force can only dominate if it is seen as a right, and obedience as a duty [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The social order is a sacred right, but based on covenants, not nature [Rousseau]
The government is instituted by a law, not by a contract [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The social pact is the total subjection of individuals to the general will [Rousseau]
We need a protective association which unites forces, but retains individual freedom [Rousseau]
To foreign powers a state is seen as a simple individual [Rousseau]
The act of association commits citizens to the state, and the state to its citizens [Rousseau]
Citizens must ultimately for forced to accept the general will (so freedom is compulsory!) [Rousseau]
Individual citizens still retain a private will, which may be contrary to the general will [Rousseau]
The general will is common interest; the will of all is the sum of individual desires [Rousseau]
The general will is always right, but the will of all can err, because it includes private interests [Rousseau]
If the state contains associations there are fewer opinions, undermining the general will [Rousseau]
If a large knowledgeable population votes in isolation, their many choices will have good results [Rousseau]
The general will changes its nature when it focuses on particulars [Rousseau]
The general will is always good, but sometimes misunderstood [Rousseau]
Laws are authentic acts of the general will [Rousseau]
Assemblies must always confirm the form of government, and the current administration [Rousseau]
The more unanimous the assembly, the stronger the general will becomes [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Citizens should be independent of each other, and very dependent on the state [Rousseau]
A citizen is a subject who is also sovereign [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
The flourishing of arts and letters is too much admired [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Ancient monarchs were kings of peoples; modern monarchs more cleverly rule a land [Rousseau]
The highest officers under a monarchy are normally useless; the public could choose much better [Rousseau]
Hereditary monarchy is easier, but can lead to dreadful monarchs [Rousseau]
Attempts to train future kings don't usually work, and the best have been unprepared [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Natural aristocracy is primitive, and hereditary is dreadful, but elective aristocracy is best [Rousseau]
Natural aristocracy is primitive, hereditary is bad, and elective aristocracy is the best [Rousseau]
Large states need a nobility to fill the gap between a single prince and the people [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Law makers and law implementers should be separate [Rousseau]
The state has a legislature and an executive, just like the will and physical power in a person [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
I call the executive power the 'government', which is the 'prince' - a single person, or a group [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / d. Size of government
Large populations needs stronger control, which means power should be concentrated [Rousseau]
Democracy for small states, aristocracy for intermediate, monarchy for large [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
If inhabitants are widely dispersed, organising a revolt is much more difficult [Rousseau]
The state is not bound to leave civil authority to its leaders [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
If the sovereign entrusts government to at least half the citizens, that is 'democracy' [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Democratic elections are dangerous intervals in government [Rousseau]
Silence of the people implies their consent [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
The English are actually slaves in between elections [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
Minorities only accept majority-voting because of a prior unanimous agreement [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democracy leads to internal strife, as people struggle to maintain or change ways of ruling [Rousseau]
When ministers change the state changes, because they always reverse policies [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 10. Theocracy
In early theocracies the god was the king, and there were as many gods as nations [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Sometimes full liberty is only possible at the expense of some complete enslavement [Rousseau]
We can never assume that the son of a slave is a slave [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Appetite alone is slavery, and self-prescribed laws are freedom [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
The social compact imposes conventional equality of rights on people who may start unequally [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
No citizen should be rich enough to buy another, and none so poor as forced to sell himself [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
If we all give up all of our rights together to the community, we will always support one another [Rousseau]
In society man loses natural liberty, but gains a right to civil liberty and property [Rousseau]
We alienate to society only what society needs - but society judges that, not us [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Private property must always be subordinate to ownership by the whole community [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The state ensures liberty, so civil law separates citizens, and binds them to the state [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural justice, without sanctions, benefits the wicked, who exploit it [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
We accept the death penalty to prevent assassinations, so we must submit to it if necessary [Rousseau]
A trial proves that a criminal has broken the social treaty, and is no longer a member of the state [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / c. Deterrence of crime
Only people who are actually dangerous should be executed, even as an example [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
War gives no right to inflict more destruction than is necessary for victory [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
Wars are between States, not people, and the individuals are enemies by accident [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
By separating theological and political systems, Jesus caused divisions in the state [Rousseau]
Civil religion needs one supreme god, an afterlife, justice, and the sanctity of the social contract [Rousseau]
All religions should be tolerated, if they tolerate each other, and support citizenship [Rousseau]
Every society has a religion as its base [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
The amount of taxation doesn't matter, if it quickly circulates back to the citizens [Rousseau]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden]
Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden]
'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Space and time are the order of all possibilities, and don't just relate to what is actual [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden]
Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
A tyrant exploits Christians because they don't value this life, and are made to be slaves [Rousseau]