16 ideas
9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
22809 | The social contract sees society as constituted by and for individuals [Taylor,C] |
22811 | Assigning a right based on a human capacity implies that the capacity should be developed [Taylor,C] |
22815 | If freedom depends on society and culture, the greatest freedom is in shaping them [Taylor,C] |
22814 | Our reliance on other people close to us does not imply any political obligations [Taylor,C] |
22812 | For most people the primacy of rights mainly concerns freedom [Taylor,C] |
22810 | A right is not just a rule, but also asserts certain ideas of moral worth [Taylor,C] |
22813 | Property is not essential for life, but it may be essential for independence [Taylor,C] |
23417 | If the state is neutral, there won't be sufficient community to support a welfare state [Taylor,C, by Kymlicka] |
19384 | Space and time are the order of all possibilities, and don't just relate to what is actual [Leibniz] |