Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Antoine Arnauld', 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person' and 'Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis'

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61 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz]
The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine]
Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz]
Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz]
Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz]
Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz]
If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
Concepts are language [Quine]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz]
Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / c. Animal Souls
Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz]