Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letter to the Editor about Bayle', 'Science without Numbers' and 'Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals'

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42 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
9570 In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
10260 Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
8958 In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
18221 'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
8757 The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
18212 Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
10261 The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro]
18218 Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H]
9623 Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
18215 It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
18216 Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H]
18214 Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H]
18210 Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
22427 To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
18211 You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
8959 Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
18213 Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
22413 Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn]
22415 Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn]
22416 Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn]
22422 Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn]
22428 You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
22414 You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn]
22423 Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn]
22426 We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
22412 Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn]
22421 Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn]
22424 Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn]
22425 The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
7629 We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
18222 Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
22420 The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn]
18410 Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn]
22417 Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn]
18402 Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 4. Abstracta by Example
9917 'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
22418 I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
11945 In addition to laws, God must also create appropriate natures for things [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
19348 All that is real in motion is the force or power which produces change [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
18223 In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
18220 Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
18219 Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H]