Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'De modo distinguendi phaenomena', 'Philosophy without Intuitions' and 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
So-called 'though experiments' are just philosophers observing features of the world [Cappelen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz]
The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
The word 'intuitive' often plays not role at all in arguments, and can be removed [Cappelen]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]