14 ideas
| 5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
| 9169 | A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam] |
| 5819 | Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam] |
| 5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
| 5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
| 2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
| 7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
| 7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
| 9168 | I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam] |
| 5820 | 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam] |
| 9170 | We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam] |
| 5817 | Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam] |
| 5818 | If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam] |
| 5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |