85 ideas
12926 | Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz] |
12903 | Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz] |
12914 | Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
18835 | Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt] |
12915 | Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz] |
19333 | A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz] |
12910 | The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz] |
18819 | The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt] |
10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10906 | Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10907 | The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10909 | Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
10912 | Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
18826 | 'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt] |
10908 | Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
18803 | Semantics for propositions: 1) validity preserves truth 2) non-contradition 3) bivalence 4) truth tables [Rumfitt] |
18814 | 'Absolute necessity' would have to rest on S5 [Rumfitt] |
18798 | It is the second-order part of intuitionistic logic which actually negates some classical theorems [Rumfitt] |
18799 | Intuitionists can accept Double Negation Elimination for decidable propositions [Rumfitt] |
18830 | Most set theorists doubt bivalence for the Continuum Hypothesis, but still use classical logic [Rumfitt] |
18843 | The iterated conception of set requires continual increase in axiom strength [Rumfitt] |
18836 | A set may well not consist of its members; the empty set, for example, is a problem [Rumfitt] |
18837 | A set can be determinate, because of its concept, and still have vague membership [Rumfitt] |
18845 | If the totality of sets is not well-defined, there must be doubt about the Power Set Axiom [Rumfitt] |
18815 | Logic is higher-order laws which can expand the range of any sort of deduction [Rumfitt] |
18805 | Classical logic rules cannot be proved, but various lines of attack can be repelled [Rumfitt] |
18804 | The case for classical logic rests on its rules, much more than on the Principle of Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
18827 | If truth-tables specify the connectives, classical logic must rely on Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
18813 | Logical consequence is a relation that can extended into further statements [Rumfitt] |
18808 | Normal deduction presupposes the Cut Law [Rumfitt] |
18840 | When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt] |
18802 | In specifying a logical constant, use of that constant is quite unavoidable [Rumfitt] |
18800 | Introduction rules give deduction conditions, and Elimination says what can be deduced [Rumfitt] |
18809 | Logical truths are just the assumption-free by-products of logical rules [Rumfitt] |
18807 | Monotonicity means there is a guarantee, rather than mere inductive support [Rumfitt] |
18842 | Maybe an ordinal is a property of isomorphic well-ordered sets, and not itself a set [Rumfitt] |
12920 | There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz] |
18834 | Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero [Rumfitt] |
18846 | Cantor and Dedekind aimed to give analysis a foundation in set theory (rather than geometry) [Rumfitt] |
12319 | What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz] |
12922 | A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz] |
13079 | A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz] |
12745 | Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz] |
12921 | Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz] |
12746 | We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz] |
12916 | A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz] |
12919 | Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz] |
12923 | Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz] |
12704 | Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz] |
18839 | An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt] |
18838 | The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt] |
13077 | Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz] |
12908 | Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz] |
12706 | Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz] |
12906 | Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz] |
18816 | Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt] |
18825 | S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt] |
18824 | Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt] |
18828 | If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt] |
18821 | Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt] |
12904 | If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz] |
11981 | If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz] |
18831 | Medieval logicians said understanding A also involved understanding not-A [Rumfitt] |
12905 | I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz] |
19334 | I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz] |
18820 | In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt] |
5033 | Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz] |
12913 | Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz] |
13089 | To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz] |
5034 | Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz] |
5032 | It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz] |
5031 | Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz] |
12911 | Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz] |
18817 | We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt] |
18829 | The truth grounds for 'not A' are the possibilities incompatible with truth grounds for A [Rumfitt] |
12925 | Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz] |
12927 | Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz] |
15955 | I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz] |
12907 | Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz] |
12924 | Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz] |
12909 | Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz] |
5030 | Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz] |
12912 | Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz] |
12917 | The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz] |
12918 | Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz] |