16 ideas
| 18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
| 18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
| 18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
| 18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
| 18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
| 18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
| 18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
| 12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
| 10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
| 13191 | The properties of a thing flow from its essence [Leibniz] |
| 12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
| 18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
| 12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
| 12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
| 12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |
| 18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |