Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians', 'The Coherence Theory of Truth' and 'The Theory of Logical Types'

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19 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell]
Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO]
Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz]
Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz]