19 ideas
19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
21566 | 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell] |
21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
23457 | Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell] |
21556 | Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey] |
21568 | A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell] |
13195 | To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz] |
13193 | Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz] |
19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |
13194 | God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz] |
13196 | All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz] |
13192 | Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz] |