16 ideas
| 19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
| 19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
| 19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
| 19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
| 19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
| 19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
| 19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
| 13160 | To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz] |
| 13161 | Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz] |
| 13195 | To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz] |
| 13193 | Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz] |
| 19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
| 19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |
| 13194 | God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz] |
| 13196 | All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz] |
| 13192 | Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz] |