Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letter on Freedom', 'Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong' and 'Supervenience'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
5042 For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
12619 We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
12620 If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
16039 Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K]
16043 Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
16047 Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16040 Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K]
16044 Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K]
16046 Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16049 Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
12613 Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
16042 The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
12617 Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
12615 Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
6650 Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
12618 It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12614 I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12621 Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
12622 Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
12623 The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
12616 English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]