159 ideas
18495 | The best philosophers I know are the best people I know [Heil] |
18494 | Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions [Heil] |
18506 | Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics [Heil] |
18535 | Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically [Heil] |
12997 | Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz] |
13009 | A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz] |
12963 | Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz] |
19360 | General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz] |
12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
18534 | Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers [Heil] |
18531 | Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil] |
18509 | Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true [Heil] |
13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
12992 | Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz] |
10056 | At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz] |
12974 | People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz] |
15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
13002 | It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz] |
13008 | Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz] |
12956 | Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz] |
18518 | Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers [Heil] |
12937 | We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz] |
18500 | How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers [Heil] |
12932 | The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz] |
18539 | Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil] |
12966 | Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz] |
18505 | Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil] |
18499 | Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil] |
12993 | Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz] |
12989 | Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz] |
18512 | Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being [Heil] |
18508 | Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil] |
18532 | If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations [Heil] |
15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
18510 | We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil] |
18522 | Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil] |
18513 | Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil] |
18540 | Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil] |
18533 | In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil] |
18511 | Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil] |
12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
18523 | Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil] |
18524 | Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil] |
12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
18498 | Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil] |
12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
18507 | Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances [Heil] |
12943 | Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz] |
11855 | Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz] |
12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
12986 | The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz] |
12968 | A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz] |
18515 | Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil] |
18516 | A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil] |
18514 | Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil] |
18517 | Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil] |
12931 | Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz] |
12811 | We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz] |
12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
5057 | If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz] |
12987 | For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz] |
12884 | The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz] |
12975 | We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz] |
12805 | If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz] |
12806 | Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
12972 | Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz] |
5055 | No two things are totally identical [Leibniz] |
15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
12978 | A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz] |
18502 | If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil] |
17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
18496 | If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil] |
12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
13006 | Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz] |
12996 | I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz] |
13003 | The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz] |
21253 | Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz] |
12933 | Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz] |
12991 | Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz] |
12929 | All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz] |
12940 | What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz] |
19358 | Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz] |
12948 | A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz] |
13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
4302 | You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz] |
12947 | We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz] |
12930 | The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz] |
13001 | Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz] |
12949 | Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz] |
5053 | The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz] |
15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
12977 | We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz] |
5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
12944 | It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz] |
18525 | Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent [Heil] |
12951 | Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz] |
18504 | Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation [Heil] |
19364 | Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz] |
12942 | Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz] |
12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
18503 | You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil] |
12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
18537 | Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil] |
18538 | Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil] |
12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
18536 | The subject-predicate form reflects reality [Heil] |
12946 | The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz] |
12964 | If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz] |
18497 | Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil] |
12958 | Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz] |
12957 | The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz] |
12962 | Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz] |
12934 | We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz] |
12936 | There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz] |
18519 | If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy [Heil] |
18526 | We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil] |
18527 | Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause [Heil] |
15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
12985 | Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz] |
18520 | Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations [Heil] |
12952 | Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz] |
12955 | If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz] |
18501 | Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature? [Heil] |
12954 | God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz] |
12988 | The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz] |
1414 | A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz] |
21252 | Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz] |
19328 | Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
5058 | Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz] |