Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Discourse on Metaphysics', 'Epistemic Norms' and 'Causes and Events: Mackie on causation'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
19342 Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
8820 Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
8819 We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
4779 For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times [Kim, by Psillos]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
12711 The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
19349 The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
7558 Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
16761 Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
13088 Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
8822 Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
13085 Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
8818 Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
5024 Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
8811 What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
8817 Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8814 Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8823 Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8813 If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
8812 Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock]
8816 Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
8815 Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
5027 If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
5023 Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
2119 People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
5025 Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
5026 Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz]